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1 Introduction
The migration of labor out of agriculture has represented a fundamental issue in the
early models of development economics (Lewis, 1954; Sen 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970;
see Ghatak, Levine and Wheatly Price, 1996, for an excellent survey). In these models,
the agricultural sector is typically characterized by stagnation and under-productive use
of labor, while the urban industrial sector is viewed as the one that contributes most
to economic development and modernization. This literature has thus seen migration
from the rural to the urban sector as a road out of backwardness and poverty, which are
intrinsically linked to agricultural production.
However, recent work has argued that rural migration may also exert a positive effect
on the rural sector itself. Migration and remittances may contribute to alleviate financial
and productive constraints in the rural sector.1 Migration may exert a positive effect on
asset accumulation and, thus, help lift families permanently out of poverty. More specif-
ically, Stark (1991) sustains that migrants may play the role of financial intermediaries,
enabling rural households to overcome credit constraints and missing insurance markets.
Furthermore, migration may mitigate the impact of agricultural income shocks by allow-
ing families to relocate labor to the cities when that is needed (Lucas and Stark, 1985).
Individuals in a household pool resources to finance migration of one of their members
who later on repays by remitting a part of his/her income back to the family. Thus, house-
holds tend to optimally spread their labor force over different geographic markets in order
to better pool risks. Household surveys also show that remittances tend to play a key
role on the survival and livelihood strategies for many (typically rural) poor households
(Rapoport and Docquier, 2005).
Our paper contributes to this latter stand of literature by assessing the effect of mi-
gration and remittances on physical asset accumulation, studying differences by type of
asset, i.e. productive and non-productive. Using a unique panel database for Mexican
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rural households, the econometric results presented in this paper show that migration and
remittances indeed open up a possibility for poor households to accelerate asset accumu-
lation.
Several endogeneity issues need to be addressed in order to avoid potential biases.
First, households may respond to adverse or positive shocks by changing the number of
migrants or the nature of migration (temporal vs. permanent). Second, selection bias
may occur if migrant households are intrinsically different from non-migrant ones (see for
instance Jaeger et al., 2010). Third, dynamic specifications in short panels produce large
biases in fixed-effects models. Following previous work on this subject (see Acosta, 2006,
and McKenzie and Sasin, 2007) we deploy an instrumental variables strategy in order to
cope with endogeneity issues based on migration networks. Our identification strategy
relies on variation in aggregate migration across time and space. We also implement a
GMM strategy to eliminate the dynamic panel bias that arises in short panels.
We frame the empirical results within a two-period model of investment and migration
decisions of credit constrained rural households. The model shows that migration affects
investment only for moderately poor households, while it leads to increasing consumption
for the very poor and relatively rich households. The fact that rural households use
remittances to increase the accumulation of assets represents an important and, at the
same time, not obvious result. More precisely, it may well be the case that remittances
are channelled instead towards increasing consumption and leisure, which may increase
households’ current well-being, but will not help to improve their dynamic prospects.
Migration and remittances have been largely studied in the microeconometric liter-
ature with respect to the accumulation of human capital. As argued in Hanson and
Woodruff (2003) the additional income from remittances may allow children to delay en-
tering the work force. Yang (2008) also finds a positive effect of remittances on child
schooling and educational expenditure in Philippines using exchange rate shocks as a
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source of exogenous variation for remittances. However, it has been argued as well that
migration may alter the family structure, raising child-rearing responsibilities and, there-
fore, having negative consequences on household welfare. Moreover, Acosta (2006) sus-
tains that it may be expected that recipient families will expand their consumption of
leisure (and reduce labor supply) and increase their dependence on external transfers.
The closest article to ours is Adams (1998) that studies the effect of remittances in
rural Pakistan and found that they help to increase investment in rural assets by raising
the marginal propensity to invest for migrant households. The topic addressed here is
also related to the effect of credit constraints in the urban informal sector. Woodruff
and Zenteno (2007) found a positive impact of remittances in Mexico (they are shown
to be responsible for almost 20% of the capital invested). In the same vein, Mesnard
and Ravaillon (2002) and Mesnard (2004) studied the temporary migration decision of
workers who are credit constrained in Tunisia and evaluates the extent to which liquidity
constraints affect self-employment decisions of returned migrants. There is also some
evidence on this issue for the case of internal migration in India (Banerjee and Bucci,
1994). Our paper extends these results to rural poor households.
Finally, the effects of remittances on capital accumulation has also been studied at
the macroeconomic level by Glytsos (1993) and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) who
provide evidence that remittances tend to particularly foster growth in countries with less
developed financial systems by helping them overcome liquidity constraints. Their results
are thus consistent with ours based on household-level data.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that accounts
for migration and investment decisions. Section 3 describes the unique dataset used to
construct the panel of rural households. Section 4 presents the methodology used for
constructing the asset indexes. Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6
carries the econometric analysis showing the effect of migration on asset accumulation.
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Section 7 concludes.
2 Migration and investment decisions in a two-period
maximization problem
This section proposes a simple model to illustrate how poor families may resort to migra-
tion as a response to credit constraints that prevent them from investing in productive
assets. In particular, the model aims at showing that poor families may, under certain
conditions, choose to send migrants so as to use their remittances to overcome binding
credit constraints.
We will first start with a two-period model in which the possibility of sending migrants
is excluded. This will set a benchmark upon which we can then compare the optimal
behavior of families when they do have the opportunity to send a migrant to a richer
region or city, and receive positive remittances from the migrant.
2.1 No-migration regime
There is a continuum of rural families (or households) i ∈ I who live for two periods,
t = {1, 2}. At the beginning of each period t each family i receives an amount of income
equal to yt,i, where yt,i is the realization of a random variable uniformly and independently
distributed across families along the non-empty interval [1, y]. For simplicity, and without
any loss of generality, we henceforth let y = 2. In addition, we assume that y1,i = y2,i = yi;
that is, income realizations are persistent within families. More broadly speaking, we
could also interpret the variable yi as capturing the effect of family specific productive
assets (for example, different families may own plots of land that differ in terms of their
level of fertility); in the econometric terminology used below, the variable yi captures
family-specific fixed-effects.
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Families derive log-utility from consumption at the end of each period t and we assume
no discount factor is applied on future consumption.2 All families are credit-constrained,
and then, they cannot increase current consumption by borrowing against future income.
Families, however, have access to a storing technology (with no depreciation), hence they
may transfer present income to the future in case they wish so.
All families have also access to an indivisible investment project (an investment in
productive assets that increases productivity in the future, for example, investing in irri-
gation or buying a new tractor). In particular, in period 1 families can choose whether or
not to invest in a project that requires 1 unit of capital as investment, and yields R > 1
units of income at the end of period 2.
The families’ optimization problem may be approached by noting that it involves two
different issues: first, choosing whether or not to invest in the project at the beginning
of t = 1; second, choosing the optimal consumption flow, conditional on the former
investment decision. We can then solve the problem for family i simply by comparing
the maximum utility achieved in each of the two possible scenarios: (a) investing in the
project; (b) not investing in it. We denote by ct,i consumption in period t and by s1,i the
amount of income stored from t = 1 until t = 2.
Case (a): Invest in the project. Family i solves:
max : Ui,I = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (1)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i − 1,
c2,i = yi + s1,i +R,
s1,i ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to observe that in problem (??) the constraint s1,i ≥ 0 will bind
in the optimum (i.e., families would like to borrow against future income so as to smooth
consumption, but they are not able to do so). Hence, families will optimally set s∗1,i = 0,
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implying that: c∗1,i,I = yi−1 and c∗2,i,I = yi+R. As a result, the maximum utility achieved
by a family with income yi that invests in the project is given by:
U∗i,I = ln (yi − 1) + ln (yi +R) . (2)
Case (b): No investment. Family i solves:
max : Ui,NI = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (3)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i,
c2,i = yi + s1,i,
s1,i ≥ 0.
Since the income flow is identical in both periods and future is not discounted, families
will optimally consume yi in each of the two periods, so as to achieve perfect consumption
smoothing. That is, c∗1,i,NI = c
∗
2,i,NI = yi, which in turn implies s
∗
1,i,NI = 0. Hence, the
utility achieved by a family with income yi that decides not to invest is given by:
U∗i,NI = ln
(
y2i
)
. (4)
Finally, families will choose to invest if and only if that allows them to obtain higher
intertemporal utility than not investing. Henceforth, we let I = 1 (I = 0) denote the
choice to invest in the productive asset (not to invest in it) in t = 1. Then, comparing
(??) and (??) implies:
Ii = 1 ⇔ yi > R/ (R− 1) . (5)
The expression (??) stipulates that only families with (permanent) income larger than
R/(R− 1) will invest in the project. The reason for this is that, in the presence of credit
constraints, given that utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, only sufficiently
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rich families are willing to give away one unit of consumption in t = 1 in order to be able
to invest and increase consumption t = 2 by R units.3 Henceforth, we assume that R > 2,
so that there exist a permanent income threshold 1 < y < 2 such that families whose yi ≥
y are willing to invest Ii = 1.
2.2 Migration allowed
Assume now that after observing the income realization yi at the beginning of t = 1, family
i could choose whether or not to send one of their members to a richer city or region in
the first period. Sending a migrant imposes an “emotional” cost M > 0, measured in
terms of utility.4 Migration is treated as a risky asset when compared with the risk-free
income in the village. The migrant may get a good job in the region he migrated to,
which yields net income υ, where 1 ≤ υ < 1 + R. Instead, if the migrant fails to find a
good job, he receives net income equal to 0.5 Notice that migration will naturally reduce
households’ labor income at the home village (due to the lowered domestic labor force).
In that respect, we should henceforth interpret the ‘net income’ υ (when finding a good
job) and 0 (when not finding it) as net of the concomitant reduced labor income at the
home village.
We assume that local networks in the city where migrants move to make it easier for
them to obtain a good job.6 In particular, we postulate that the migrant from family
i will manage to find good job with probability p(ni) = ni, where ni ∈ [0, 1] represents
the ‘network density’ that family i has got in the recipient city. We assume that ni is
uniformly distributed along the interval [0, 1] in the population, and that the correlation
between ni and yi in the population equals zero.
We denote by U˜∗i the utility achieved by family i if they choose to send a migrant
(whereas, as before, U∗i denotes the utility of family if they do not send a migrant).
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Relatively rich families: Consider family i with network density ni ∈ [0, 1] and income
yi ≥ R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that this family will always invest
in the project. That is, it will invest regardless of whether it chooses to send a migrant
or not, and, in the case they do send a migrant, regardless of whether the migrant finds
a good job or not. As a result, if they do not send a migrant, their utility equals that
stated in (??). On the other hand, if they do send a migrant, their utility is given by:
U˜∗,richi,I = ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)] + (1− ni) [ln (yi − 1) + ln(yi +R)]−M. (6)
A family with yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) will thus send a migrant if and only if U˜∗,richi,I > U∗i,I , which
in turn leads to:
If yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) , send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1)] ≥M. (7)
Relatively poor families: Consider now the case of family i with ni ∈ [0, 1] and
yi < R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that such a family will not invest
in the project if, after sending a migrant, this migrant fails to obtain a good job. Nor will
they invest in the project when they do not send a migrant, as this situation is isomorphic
to the no-migration regime.
The first question to address is then the following: should a family who sent a migrant
invest in the project when the migrant obtains a good job? Consider such a family: the
two expressions below show the utility achieved by the family, first, in the case it invests
in the project and, second, in the case it does not.
U˜∗,poori,I = ni [ln (y + υ − 1) + ln(y +R)] + (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]−M, (8)
U˜∗,poori,NI = ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2]
+ (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]−M. (9)
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Hence, comparing (??) and (??), it follows that families with yi < R/ (R− 1) who send
a migrant will invest in the project, if and only if the migrant finds a good job and the
following condition holds:
yi >
R
R− 1 −
υ
(
R− υ
4
)
R− 1 ≡ ŷ. (10)
Notice that ŷ < R/ (R− 1). In fact, it may well be that ŷ < 1.7
The second question to deal with is, bearing in mind equations (??) and (??), should a
family with ni ∈ [0, 1] and yi < R/ (R− 1) send a migrant or not? Answering this question
demands comparing U∗i,NI to U˜
∗,poor
i,I for those families with yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, whereas for those
families whose yi ≤ ŷ we must compare U∗i,NI to U˜∗,poori,NI . We can thus obtain the following
two conditions:
If yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )] ≥M ;(11)
If yi < ŷ, send migrant iff: ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i )] ≥M. (12)
Since a larger network, ni, increases the chances the migrant finds a good job (or,
in other words, the expected return from sending a migrant increases with ni), families
with a larger ni will naturally tend to be more prone to send a migrant. The following
proposition states this result more formally.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuous and strictly increasing function n˜(y) : R++ →
R++, such that for all ni ≥ n˜(yi) :
(i) If yi ∈
[
R
R−1 , 2
]
, then condition (??) holds.
(ii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, then condition (??) holds.
(iii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ, then condition (??) holds.
Furthermore, if M ≤ ln(R), then for y = R
R−1 , we have that 0 < n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1.
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Proof. In Appendix A.
Proposition ?? states that, for each family i with income yi there exists a threshold in
the network density, n˜(yi), such that if ni ≥ n˜(yi) this family chooses to send a migrant.
The network threshold n˜(y) is strictly increasing in y, implying that a larger mass of
migrants will originate from relatively poor families than from relatively rich ones. The
intuition for this is that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in the level
of consumption, while the disutility from migration, M , is constant for any level of con-
sumption. As a result, poorer families will be more eager to endure the emotional cost
M , because their marginal return of migration in terms of (expected) utility of additional
consumption is larger. Notice, finally, that Proposition ?? does not explicitly restrict
n˜(y) ≤ 1. In fact, it may well be the case that n˜(y) > 1 for some y > 1, implying that no
migrants will originate from families with incomes above that level.
From now onwards we let M ≤ ln(R) hold. This assumption can be read as saying
that the emotional cost of migration, M , is not too large relative to the returns from
investing in risky assets, R. Notice from the last sentence in Proposition ?? that, since
M ≤ ln(R) implies n˜ ( R
R−1
)
< 1, then there will exist some families whose incomes are
below the threshold level R/(R− 1) who will choose to send migrants.
The next step is to study how migration decisions interact with investment decisions.
In particular, we are interested in studying whether families send migrants with the aim
to increase their capacity to invest in the projects. By merging the migration results in
Proposition ?? with the preceding discussion in this section, we can summarize households’
optimal decisions concerning migration and investment in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
(i) If R ≥ υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ ≤ 1, and:
a) For any y ∈ [ R
R−1 , 2
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
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and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈ [1, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
(ii) If R < υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ > 1, and:
a) For any y ∈ [ R
R−1 , 2
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈ (ŷ, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
c) For any y ∈ [1, ŷ]: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y) and
yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i never invests in the project.
The results from Corollary ?? can be visually summarized in Figure 1. The key insight
of the corollary can be gleaned from point b), both for cases (i) and (ii) therein. The
result in b) says there exist some families who use migration as a mechanism to mitigate
credit constraints that prevent them from investing in projects that would raise their
intertemporal income. Essentially, those families send a migrant, betting on the chance
that this migrant finds a good job, which would increase their total income in t = 1 and,
thus, place them in better position to undertake the unit investment that yields R > 1
units of income in t = 2.
2.3 Effect of migration on investment decisions
We now study the effect of migration on families’ investment decisions. The migration
effect results from calculating the difference in investment decisions between migrant and
non-migrant families. First consider E [I|m = 1, y] − E [I|m = 0, y], where I and m
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are indicator functions regarding investment and migration decisions, respectively. In
relation to the empirical results in this paper, we refer to this model as fixed-effects (FE)
model, because by conditioning on y we are controlling for the family-specific FE. Note
from Corollary ?? that, for any y ≥ R
R−1 , families choose I = 1 irrespective of their
migration choice; while (in case (ii) of the corollary), for y < ŷ, families always set I = 0,
regardless of their migration choices. It follows then that migration has only an effect on
the investment behavior of families with ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1 ; in particular:
E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
− E [I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
> 0 (13)
Equation (??) makes it explicit that migration exerts a positive effect on investment
decisions.8 However, notice that a key feature of the problem is the fact that intrinsic
family characteristics need to be taken into account when evaluating the effect of migration
on investment. In fact, if those characteristics are not controlled for, the measured effect
of migration on investment may turn out to be incorrect, because by simply comparing
the average behavior of families with and without migrants, we may also be capturing the
influence of other variables that somehow correlate with migration decisions. This idea is
further developed in Appendix C.
3 Data
We make use of a unique new dataset available for poor rural households in Mexico. The
data was collected for administrative purposes by the Oportunidades (ex Progresa) pro-
gram. Launched in Mexico in 1997, it is a program whose main aim is to improve the
process of human capital accumulation in the poorest communities by providing condi-
tional cash transfers on specific types of behavior in three key areas: nutrition, health
and education. Thanks to retrospective information, we managed to construct a panel of
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households based on three surveys. In December 2006, the Instituto Nacional de Salud
Pu´blica conducted a survey9 of recipient households in the rural localities where the Opor-
tunidades program started in 1997 with a 10% random sample, stratified by state. This
database is then matched to another survey, the ENCASEH (Encuesta de Caracteristicas
Socioeconomicas de los Hogares), carried out in 1997 and 1998, and to the ENCRECEH
(Encuesta de Recertificacio´n de los Hogares) carried out in 2001. This allows us to build
a balanced panel database composed of three time observations (1997, 2001 and 2006) for
4,365 households from 130 rural localities. However, it should be noted that this database
may not be representative of rural Mexico because it was designed to cover a particular
subset of the population (i.e. those receiving Oportunidades). Therefore, the conclusions
from the empirical results may only apply to this group.
This constructed database includes detailed information on each beneficiary household,
including household demographics, income level and sources, education and several types
of assets. It also includes locality-level data, mainly regarding infrastructure. Although
it was not designed to evaluate migration patterns the database contains a few questions
about household members that migrated. Moreover, from the income data we obtain
information about remittances. Given the risk of attrition bias in our estimation, we
compared the distributions between the balanced panel of 4,365 and the unbalanced panel.
The distributions of the kernel density estimates appear to be very close to each other
and this is confirmed by the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests that we run on the
hypothesis that the distributions of the balanced and unbalanced panels are the same for
some key variables. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected across all tests10.
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4 The construction of an asset index
The first step in our empirical analysis is to reduce the household assets to unidimensional
measures. This requires either complete knowledge of the market value of each asset
owned or the construction of an asset index. Given that the prices of many assets owned
by households are often unknown or difficult to determine, we construct the asset index
using the methodology used by Adato et al. (2006): the household income11 is regressed
on the household’s stock of assets. The household asset index is then the household
income predicted from the estimated coefficients in the first year (1997), which are used
to extrapolate to every year. The equation we estimate is of the form:
yi,1997 = β0 + β1x1i,1997 + β2x2i,1997 + STATEi + ei,1997, (14)
where yi,t is the per-capita income by household, x1i,t is a vector of household assets we are
interested in, x2i,t is a vector of other household characteristics and STATE correspond
to state dummy variables. The asset index is then constructed as
Ai,t = βˆ1x1i,t. (15)
The asset index is standardized by its standard deviation. This simplifies the interpre-
tation of the regression analysis results (i.e. a regression coefficient of one means one
standard deviation of the index). First principal component analysis was also used with
this data and results remain similar. For the sake of brevity results are not shown but
they are available from the authors.
In poor regions, particularly where there is limited capacity to collect consumption,
expenditure and price data, there is an asset-based alternative to the standard use of
expenditures in defining well-being and poverty. Sahn and Stifel (2002) find that the con-
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struction of an asset index is a valid predictor of a crucial manifestation of poverty and
that is measured as a proxy for a long-term wealth with less error than expenditures. We
consider three asset indexes and four categories of assets. The distinction between pro-
ductive and non-productive assets is based on Adato et al. (2006), where non-productive
assets are considered as leisure and consumption:
- AP : Productive assets: owner of a truck, agricultural land, irrigated land, working
animals;
- ANP : Non-Productive (leisure) assets: ownership of radios, TV, refrigerator, gas
stove, washing machine and vehicles;
- AT : Total assets: AP and ANP ;
- Other dwelling and household characteristics such as: electricity, earth floor, weak
roof, domestic animals, own house, years of education of the household head.
We compute the asset indexes for the different periods in Table ??. The table shows
that there is a marked increase in asset accumulation for all households (HH) during the
ten-year period.
5 Descriptive statistics
We take advantage of our detailed panel database to describe the economic role played by
migration and remittances in the rural poor households. We construct a dummy variable
at the household level that indicates whether the household has at least one member
who is a migrant (i.e., working in another locality, state or abroad). In 1997, 5% of the
households had a migrant member, while 3% had a member in the US. These percentages
are somewhat reduced in 2001 (3% and 2%, respectively), but increase considerably in
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2006 (10% and 7%, respectively). These results show that even when we follow the
same households over a long period of time (10 years), there is considerable variation in
migration statistics at the household level.
Table ?? presents summary statistics of other variables of interest for the balanced
panel, pooled and separately for 1997, 2001 and 2006. The table shows that remittances
represent less than 10% of the total income in the household (0.6/7.7). Surprisingly,
this ratio is very similar for households with current migrants and for those without (the
reason for this is that remittances may come from past migrants). The (pooled) average
household has a household head with 3.3 years of schooling and has 1.4 male adults in
the labor force. Both schooling and labor participation increase in 2006. The table also
reports community level variables that will be used as IV in the next section. HH w/mig /
#HH (at the community) is the proportion of households at the community level with at
least one household member being a migrant. HH w/USmig / #HH (at the community)
represents a similar ratio but for the case when the migrant lives in the US. As explained
in the next section, the IV will work well if there is enough variation both across levels
and across type of households. A visual inspection of the table reveals that this is indeed
the case.
6 Econometric analysis
6.1 The model
Let Ait be an asset index for family i and year t. We are mostly interested in household-
specific asset dynamics. Let Mi,t be a variable that captures the migration-related nature
of the household; Xit be household characteristics; and (µi + it) be an error compo-
nent with household-specific effects and idiosyncratic temporary shocks. We consider the
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following asset dynamics equation:
Ai,t − Ai,t−1 = αAi,t−1 + βMi,t + δXi,t + µi + i,t (16)
We are mostly concerned with β ≡ ∂E[Ai,t|Ai,t−1,Mi,t,Xi,t−1,µi,ηt]
∂M
, which denotes the con-
ditional effect of migration on asset accumulation. We extend this analysis to a multi-
dimensional measure of assets A = {AP , ANP}, where AP denotes productive assets and
ANP non-productive assets. As argued above, the question we want to address here is the
effect of migration on the type of assets that families accumulate.
We study the effect of migration on asset accumulation using three different measures
of migration. First, we consider a dummy variable for households that declare having
at least one migrant member, Migrant HH (see Table ??). Second, we use the number
of migrants in the household, Number of Migrants by HH (see Table ??). Third, we
use remittances per capita (see Table ??). In each case, we separately study the effect
migration on: (i) total assets, (ii) productive assets, and (iii) non-productive assets.
As additional covariates we can only select variables that change over time within HH,
otherwise they became collinear with the fixed-effects. We use the number of HH male
adults that correspond to a measure of the HH labor force.
6.2 Endogeneity and dynamic panel bias
Several endogeneity issues need to be addressed in order to avoid potential biases in
this estimator. First, households may respond to adverse or positive shocks () changing
the number of migrants or the nature of migration (temporal vs. permanent). Second,
selection bias may occur if migrant households are intrinsically different from non-migrant
ones (see for instance Jaeger et al., 2010). Regarding the relationship between migration
and self-selection, Borjas (1987, 1991) has formalized the endogeneity of the migration
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decision, showing that the welfare impact of immigrants is crucially dependent on the
degree of transferability of their unobservable and observable variables, and that affects
the labour market.
Acosta (2006) and Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) use migration networks and history
(at the village or household level) as instruments for migration (or remittances) postu-
lating that these variables have a positive impact on the opportunity to migrate but no
additional impact on income, schooling, or nutrition at home. McKenzie and Sasin (2007)
argue that these instruments are suitable to study the migration impact at the originary
location as in our case.
Following previous work on this subject, the IV strategy we follow uses the historic
percentage of migrants (to all destinations and to the US, separately) at the community
level as an instrument for the household level decision. In particular, we use the ratio
of migrant households to total households, lagged one period, at the community level,
for all destinations and to the US as IV for our migrant variables at the household level.
These are the variables HH w/mig / #HH (at the community) and HH w/USmig / #HH
(at the community) in Table ??. Because we have a panel data, and as long as there
is variation across periods in communities, we can include these variables together with
the fixed effects at the household level. Therefore, our identification strategy relies on
variation in aggregate migration across time and space. We refer to this estimator as
IVFE.
In order to evaluate the validity of the IV, we check for the joint statistical significance
of these variables in the first-stage regressions (F-test), and for overidentifying restrictions
(Sargan-Hansen test). In all specifications the F-test statistics for the joint significance
of both instruments show that they are significantly correlated with the corresponding
endogenous variables (F > 10). Moreover, the Sargan-Hansen tests show that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments at the usual 5% significance
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level. The first stage results appear in Appendix D.
In dynamic panel data models with unobserved effects, the treatment of the initial
observations is an important theoretical and practical problem. As is well known, the
usual within estimator is inconsistent, and can be badly biased. (See, for example, Hsiao,
1986, section 4.2.) We thus follow the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM strategy by taking first order differences and using lagged values
of the dependent variable and other exogenous covariates in levels to instrument the
autoregressive dependent variable. We also use the same IV for the migration variable.
6.3 Econometric results
Tables ??, ?? and ?? report estimates for OLS, FE, IVFE and GMM estimators for
migrant HH, number of migrants and remittances per capita, respectively. The asset
index and remittances per capita are standardized to ease the interpretation of the results.
The asset index A is divided by its pooled average (i.e. 0.5 in Table ??). Therefore, all
coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of a given covariate on units of the average
asset index. Moreover, remittances per capita are divided by the pooled average total
income per capita (i.e. 7.7 in Table ??), and then, the effect of remittances per capita are
measured in units of the average income per capita of the sample.
In all cases the OLS effect of migration on assets accumulation is negative and statis-
tically significant. However, when we include the household-level FE this effect becomes
non-significant, except for non-productive assets where it continues to display a negative
sign and is statistically significant. The differences between OLS and FE show that total
and productive assets have a positive correlation with migration (see also Appendix C).
Next, we follow the IV strategy described above. Both total assets and productive
assets become positive and statistically significant while non-productive assets is, in gen-
eral, negative and statistically significant. In all cases, the GMM estimates are smaller
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than the IVFE estimates, and this is our preferred specification.
Having a migrant household increases total asset accumulation by 0.249 standard de-
viation units. Moreover, one additional household migrant contributes to 0.035 total
assets standard deviation units. Finally, increasing the amount of remittances by the
same amount as the average HH income increases total asset accumulation by 0.039 stan-
dard deviation units. The magnitude and sign of the effect on productive assets follow
closely that of total assets. Having a migrant household increases productive asset accu-
mulation by 0.245 standard deviation units. Moreover, one additional household migrant
contributes to 0.032 productive assets standard deviation units. Increasing the amount
of remittances by the same amount as the average HH income increases productive asset
accumulation by 0.030 standard deviation units. Finally, there is a negative IVFE effect
on non-productive asset accumulation. However, the GMM estimates for this effect are
non statistically significant in all specifications.
Overall the results show that migration can be seen as a long-term investment for the
household. Therefore, the income sent back home by the migrant is used to accumulate
productive assets, rather than non-productive assets.
7 Conclusion
This paper aims at explaining the link between migration and asset dynamics for a panel
of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997-2006. Our results suggest that
migration may be used by households as a mechanism to accelerate asset accumulation
in productive assets. The general idea is that remittances may help alleviate credit con-
straints for poor households, thus allowing them to invest in productive assets that would
be optimal under complete markets. Furthermore, our estimations also suggest that fam-
ilies who send migrants with the intention to channel remittances towards investment
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in productive assets, concomitantly reduce their accumulation of non-productive assets,
possibly to further contribute to raising funds for physical investment.
An important caveat concerning our analysis is that it has abstracted from general
equilibrium interactions, so as to focus exclusively on the direct effect of migration on
capital accumulation via remittances. One specific general equilibrium effect that may
be particularly relevant in our context is the fact that migration decisions will necessarily
affect the aggregate labor supply at the home village. On the one hand, migration lowers
aggregate labor supply at the village level, which in turn would raise equilibrium wages
and household incomes (see Jaimovich, 2010, for a growth model where this mechanism
is at play; also, see Mishra, 2007, for evidence of this general equilibrium effect in Mexico
However, looking at the household level, sending out a migrant also means losing one
of their workers (and, possibly, the most productive worker). Furthermore, it may well
be the case that the wealth effect brought about by the migrant leads household mem-
bers who remain at the village to increase their leisure consumption. In that regard,
two remarks apply here. First, although we acknowledge that these effects imply that
migration may influence accumulation also by other channels other than remittances, we
are agnostic concerning the overall sign of these additional effects. Second, the above
general equilibrium effect on the wage, which could be expected to induce an upwards
bias on the effect of remittances, will be of significant magnitude only if the total number
of migrants from the rural village varies substantially across our years of observations. In
that respect, the results in Table 2 show that the percentage of families with at least one
migrant ranges within 3% to 10% of the sampled households.
In a similar vein the effect of migration and remittances are both confounded. We
should expect that remittances increase the probability of capital accumulation as it
relaxes credit constraints. On the other hand, migration would decrease that probability
because of the loss of household members and/or less incentives to work. Both effects
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could be further exploited, as for example studying whether results change or not when
we analyze the impact of remittances for the sub-sample of migrant households vis-a-vis
non-migrant households.
Notes
1See, for example, Stark and Levhari (1982), and Rozelle, Taylor and DeBrauw (1999, 2003).
2No future discounting is just a simplifying assumption, useful for the algebraic derivations but without
any important implication. The log-utility is also assumed mainly for algebraic simplicity (in particular,
it allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the model), and could be replaced by a general CRRA
utility function without changing the main insights of the model (as we will see below, it is important
though that utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion).
3Strictly speaking, there is no risk. Hence, the DARA property should be simply understood as an
assumption on the degree of concavity of the utility function, which in turn governs the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and therefore how willing agents are to transfer resources across the two periods.
4In the literature this is known as “psychological costs”, and there exists some evidence for intra-
European migration (Molle and van Mourik, 1988). We could also add to the model some pecuniary cost
attached to sending a migrant (i.e. transportation costs), although it is important for our argument that
pecuniary costs are not too large to prevent credit constrained households from affording to send out a
migrant. In Appendix B we present an alternative version of the model where M is replaced by some
pecuniary costs of migration.
5The lower bound, υ ≥ 1, essentially says that the good jobs are sufficiently productive, making
migration (possibly) an attractive option. The upper bound, υ < 1 + R, is just posed to focus only on
those cases in which the credit constraint, si ≥ 0, binds in the optimum (as we will see later on, υ < 1+R
implies that total family income in t = 1 never exceeds that of t = 2).
6The role of networks on migration has been extensively studied in the literature (see for instance
Munshi, 2003, and the references therein).
7More precisely, ŷ < 1 whenever R ≥ υ−1 + υ4 . Notice, too, that both a larger R and larger υ make
this last inequality more likely to hold. This is quite intuitive, since the (expected) return from migration
is increasing in R and υ; in the former case indirectly through investment returns, in the latter directly
through earnings.
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8The analytical expression for E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < RR−1
]
is given by:
[
R/(R−1)
ŷ [1− n˜(yi)] dyi
]−1
ŷ
R/(R−1) 1 + n˜(yi)
2
[1− n˜(yi)] dyi.
9Encuesta de “Re-evaluacio´n de localidades incorporadas en las primeras fases del Programa (1997-
1998).” INSP, 2006.
10Not shown but available from the authors upon request.
11Income aggregates were created and broken down into five categories: agricultural wage employ-
ment, non-farm wage employment, self employment, transfers and other (including income from rent and
interests).
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Table 1: Asset Indexes, by HH migrant status
All HH HH with HH without
migrants migrants
All years
Asset Index 0.5 0.503 0.499
[0.45] [0.471] [ 0.447 ]
N 13,095 1,443 11,652
1997
Asset Index 0.388 0.387 0.388
[0.44] [ 0.452] [0.438]
2001
Asset Index 0.478 0.474 0.478
[0.445] [0.466] [0.442]
2006
Asset Index 0.634 0.649 0.632
[0.43] [0.457] [0.427]
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
HH All HH HH w/mig HH wo/mig
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All years
Per capita inc 7.7 1.9 7.847 1.70 7.667 1.95
Remittances 0.6 3.3 1.694 8.17 0.462 1.96
Yrs educ (head) 3.362 2.079 3.977 2.23 3.271 2.45
HH male adults 1.436 1.18 1.784 1.31 1.393 1.15
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.012 0.027 0.021 0.05 0.011 0.02
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.01 0.025 0.018 0.05 0.009 0.01
1997
Per Capita inc 7.289 2.536 7.424 2.275 7.272 2.566
Remittances 0.4 2.262 0.4 2.235 0.4 2.265
Yrs educ (head) 3.273 2.296 3.662 2.089 3.216 2.32
HH male adults 1.256 1.03 1.426 1.099 1.235 1.02
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.011 0.031 0.018 0.05 0.011 0.028
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.026 0.015 0.05 0.008 0.021
2001
Per capita inc 7.776 1.502 7.925 1.198 7.757 1.535
Remittances 0.503 1.836 0.305 1.398 0.528 1.882
Yrs educ (head) 3.245 2.376 3.85 2.155 3.156 2.394
HH male adults 1.29 1.046 1.674 1.204 1.243 1.015
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.021 0.015 0.049 0.007 0.013
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.006 0.019 0.012 0.048 0.005 0.011
2006
Per capita inc 7.997 1.503 8.193 1.334 7.972 1.521
Remittances 0.883 4.914 4.315 13.436 0.454 1.725
Yrs educ (head) 3.567 2.609 4.42 2.381 3.44 2.617
HH male adults 1.763 1.364 2.254 1.477 1.702 1.337
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.017 0.029 0.029 0.068 0.015 0.019
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.014 0.027 0.026 0.067 0.013 0.016
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Table 3: Growth of the Asset Index - Migrant Household
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.569*** -1.334*** -1.357*** -1.423***
(0.00986) (0.0126) (0.0154) (0.0124)
Migrant HH -0.140*** 0.0601 0.827*** 0.249***
(0.0414) (0.0455) (0.279) (0.0614)
HH Male Adults -0.0715*** 0.0836*** 0.0607*** 0.00437
(0.00783) (0.0128) (0.0156) (0.0148)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.282 0.729 0.712
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 63.81
Sargan 0.0942 0.149
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.553*** -1.349*** -1.367*** -1.442***
(0.00981) (0.0125) (0.0148) (0.0125)
Migrant HH -0.136*** 0.0596 0.689*** 0.245***
(0.0413) (0.0444) (0.267) (0.0615)
HH Male Adults -0.0799*** 0.0538*** 0.0347** -0.0217
(0.00781) (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0152)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.726
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 64.87
Sargan 0.0965 0.101
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.485*** -1.860***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0208)
Migrant HH -0.135*** -0.162*** -0.678** 0.103
(0.0467) (0.0543) (0.300) (0.0747)
HH Male Adults -0.0516*** -0.0304** -0.0113 0.00884
(0.00885) (0.0150) (0.0187) (0.0183)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.664 0.657
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 75.36
Sargan 0.434 0.613
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Table 4: Growth of the Asset Index - Number of Migrants by Household
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.569*** -1.333*** -1.357*** -1.417***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0158) (0.0123)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0290*** 0.00847 0.220*** 0.0355**
(0.00911) (0.0101) (0.0768) (0.0138)
HH Male Adults -0.0703*** 0.0841*** 0.0510*** 0.00289
(0.00790) (0.0129) (0.0180) (0.0149)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.282 0.729 0.702
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 41.93
Sargan 0.0812 0.147
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.554*** -1.348*** -1.367*** -1.436***
(0.00981) (0.0124) (0.0150) (0.0124)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0299*** 0.00826 0.182** 0.0322**
(0.00909) (0.00982) (0.0732) (0.0137)
HH Male Adults -0.0784*** 0.0543*** 0.0266 -0.0227
(0.00788) (0.0126) (0.0174) (0.0152)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.719
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 42.80
Sargan 0.0844 0.112
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.483*** -1.859***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0208)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0211** -0.0281** -0.186** 0.0192
(0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0820) (0.0175)
HH Male Adults -0.0516*** -0.0312** -0.00241 0.00571
(0.00893) (0.0151) (0.0213) (0.0185)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.663 0.650
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 49.78
Sargan 0.480 0.599
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
32
Table 5: Growth of the Asset Index - Remittances per capita
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.570*** -1.334*** -1.371*** -1.413***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0238) (0.0123)
Remittances 0.00189 0.0358*** 0.795** 0.0388**
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.344) (0.0153)
HH Male Adults -0.0751*** 0.0839*** 0.0524** 0.00632
(0.00778) (0.0128) (0.0222) (0.0148)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.281 0.730 0.517
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 5.539
Sargan 0.207 0.162
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.554*** -1.349*** -1.381*** -1.433***
(0.00982) (0.0124) (0.0224) (0.0124)
Remittances 0.000104 0.0311** 0.668** 0.0296**
(0.0118) (0.0126) (0.316) (0.0134)
HH Male Adults -0.0833*** 0.0543*** 0.0280 -0.0169
(0.00776) (0.0125) (0.0204) (0.0150)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.586
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 5.540
Sargan 0.185 0.138
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.658*** -1.492*** -1.507*** -1.861***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0201) (0.0209)
Remittances -0.0241* -0.00956 -0.613* -0.00559
(0.0133) (0.0155) (0.313) (0.0195)
HH Male Adults -0.0540*** -0.0358** -0.00341 0.0187
(0.00879) (0.0149) (0.0241) (0.0180)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.663 0.547
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 7.250
Sargan 0.479 0.620
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition ??.
Step 1: Let yi ∈
[
R
R−1 , 2
]
and define:
n˜1(yi) ≡ M
ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1) . (17)
Notice first that n˜1(yi) > 0 and finite, since both the numerator and denominator in (??)
are strictly positive and finite. Secondly, differentiating (??) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜1
dyi
=
M
[ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1)]2
(
1
yi − 1 −
1
yi + υ − 1
)
> 0,
where the result n˜
′
1(yi) > 0 follows from the fact that yi − 1 < yi + υ − 1. Finally, since
the left-hand side in (??) is strictly increasing in ni, it immediately follows that for any
ni > n˜1(yi) condition (??) holds.
Step 2: Let yi ≥ 1 and yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
and define:
n˜2(yi) ≡ M
ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )
. (18)
Firstly, n˜2(yi) > 0 and finite, because both the numerator and denominator in (??) are
strictly positive and finite. Secondly, differentiating (??) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜2
dyi
=
M
[ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )]2
(
2
yi
− 2yi +R + 2(υ − 1)
y2i +R(yi − 1) + yi(υ − 1) + υR
)
> 0,
(19)
where n˜
′
2(yi) > 0 obtains after some algebra on the second term in right-hand side of (??),
which leads to the condition that n˜
′
2(yi) > 0 iff yi(R − 1) + yiυ + 2R(υ − 1) > 0. Lastly,
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since the left-hand side in (??) is strictly increasing in ni, it immediately follows that for
any ni > n˜2(yi) condition (??) prevails.
Step 3: Let yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ and define:
n˜3(yi) ≡ M
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i ) . (20)
As in the previous two cases, n˜3(yi) > 0 and finite, as both the numerator and denominator
in (??) are strictly positive and finite. Next, differentiating (??) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜3
dyi
=
M[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i )]2
(
2
yi
− 2yi + υ
y2i +
υ2
4
+ yiυ
)
> 0, (21)
where n˜
′
3(yi) > 0 obtains after some algebra on the second term in right-hand side of (??),
which leads to the condition that n˜
′
3(yi) > 0 iff
υ2
2
+ yiυ > 0. Finally, since the left-hand
side in (??) is strictly increasing in ni, it trivially follows that for any ni > n˜3(yi) condition
(??) holds.
Step 4: Let now,
n˜(yi) =

n˜1(yi) if
R
R−1 ≤ yi ≤ 2,
n˜2(yi) if yi ≥ 1 and ŷ < yi < RR−1 ,
n˜3(yi) if yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ.
Replacing yi =
R
R−1 into (??) and (??), we can observe after some simple algebra that
n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
= n˜2
(
R
R−1
)
. Similarly, from the definition of ŷ in (??), replacing yi = ŷ into (??)
and (??), it follows that n˜2 (ŷ) = n˜3 (ŷ). As a consequence, it follows that n˜(yi) portrays
a continuous and strictly increasing function and n˜(yi) : R++ → R++.
Step 5: Finally, to prove that n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1, notice that plugging yi =
R
R−1 into (??) leads
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to:
n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
=
M
ln
(
1
R−1 + υ
)− ln ( 1
R−1
) = M
ln
(
1+υ(R−1)
R−1
1
R−1
) = M
ln [1 + υ(R− 1)] .
Therefore, n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
< 1 iff M < ln [1 + υ(R− 1)], which is guaranteed by M ≤ ln(R)
together with υ ≥ 1 and R > 1. 
Appendix B
A Simple Version of the Two-Period Investment Model with Pe-
cunary Cost of Migration
We show now that our main results of the benchmark model in Section ?? may also be
derived from slightly different version of the model, where ‘psychic costs’ are replaced by
monetary costs associated to migration decisions. In particular, we show that relatively
poor households may choose to send a migrant, betting on the chance he finds a job
with higher income and send back remittances to be invested in the productive asset. In
addition, we show that under certain feasible parametric configurations, relatively poor
families are more prone to send a migrant than relatively rich families. Notice that
this happens despite the fact that the former are more risk-averse than the latter, and
migration entails a risky choice. The reason is, again, that poorer families may have
relatively more to gain from migration, as this helps them mitigate the effects of credit
constraints.
To keep this alternative model as simple and concise as possible, we look at a case
where there are only two (permanent) income levels; namely, our previous extreme values:
yi = {1, 2}. As before, after observing the income realization yi, family i may choose
whether or not to send one of their members as a migrant in t = 1. In order to send
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a migrant, the household must pay upfront a monetary cost 0 < c < 1. The migrant
gets a good job with probability ni (which denotes, as before, the network density at
destination), in which case receives net income υ˜ = υ + c, where 1 ≤ υ < 1 + R. On the
other hand, with probability 1− ni the migrant gets net income equal to 0.
Hereafter, we assume that migration costs are small enough to ensure that households
with yi = 2 will always invest in the risky asset, no matter their migration choices and
migration outcomes. This requires that the following parametric assumption holds:
2− c > R/(R− 1). (22)
Relatively Rich Households: Assumption (??) ensures that these families always
invest Ii = 1 in the risky asset. As a result, the condition for sending a migrant when
yi = 2 will be given by: ni [ln (1 + υ) + ln(2 +R)] + (1− ni) [ln (1− c) + ln(2 +R)] ≥
ln(1) + ln(2 +R). This condition easily simplifies to:
If yi = 2, send migrant iff: ni ln (1 + υ) + (1− ni) ln (1− c) ≥ 0. (23)
Since 0 < (1− c) < 1 < (1 + υ), it follows that there exists a network threshold 0 <
n˜rich < 1, such that (??) holds if and only if ni ≥ n˜rich.
Relatively Poor Households: Consider now the case of family i with yi = 1. Such a
family will not invest in the project if the migrant fails to obtain a good job. Nor will they
invest in the project when they choose not to send a migrant. Then, as in the benchmark
model, the first question to address is the following: should a family that sent a migrant
invest in the project when the migrant manages to find a good job? The two expressions
below show the utility obtained in the case the household invests in the project when the
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migrant gets a good job and in the case it does not, respectively.
U˜∗,poori,I = ni [ln (υ) + ln(1 +R)] + (1− ni) [ln (1− c) + ln (1)] ,
U˜∗,poori,NI = ni
[
ln
(
1 + υ + υ2
)]
+ (1− ni) [ln (1− c) + ln (1)] .
Comparing these two expressions, it follows that a household with yi = 1 who chooses to
send a migrant will invest in the risky asset if and only if the migrant finds a good job
and the following parametric condition holds:12
R ≥ 1
υ
+
υ
4
(24)
In order to just focus just on the case in which households with yi = 1 resort migration
as a way to mitigate credit constraints, we will restrict the analysis to cases when condition
(??) holds.13 In these cases, a household with yi = 1 will then choose to send a migrant
when U˜∗,poori,I ≥ 2 ln(1). This, in turn, leads to the following condition:
If yi = 1, send migrant iff: ni ln [υ(1 +R)] + (1− ni) ln (1− c) ≥ 0. (25)
Given that 0 < (1− c) < 1 < υ(1 + R), it follows that there exists a network threshold
0 < n˜poor < 1, such that (??) holds if and only if ni ≥ n˜poor. Hence, similarly to our
benchmark model, whenever (??) holds, then some of the relatively poor families use
migration as a mechanism to possibly overcome binding credit constraints.
Finally, comparing (??) and (??), we can observe that n˜poor < n˜rich. This results
stems from the fact that:
ln [υ(1 +R)] > ln (1 + υ) ,
since both υ > 1 and R > 1. As a result, it must be true that: n˜rich ln [υ(1 +R)] +
(1− n˜rich) ln (1− c) > n˜rich ln (1 + υ) + (1− n˜rich) ln (1− c) = 0, implying that n˜poor <
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n˜rich, since the LHS of (??) is strictly increasing in ni. Therefore, similarly to our bench-
mark model, whenever (??) holds, poorer households are more prone to send migrants,
which in turn implies that simple OLS regressions may well yield downwards biased esti-
mations of the effect of migrations on investment in physical capital, in a similar fashion
as previously illustrated in Proposition ??.
Appendix C
Bias in OLS estimator.
To make this last argument more precise, consider now the overall association between
migration and investment in the population; this results from calculating the difference,
E [I|m = 1]−E [I|m = 0]. In parallel with the empirical results, we refer to this model
as ordinary least-squares (OLS) effect. After some algebra we obtain
E [I|m = 1]− E [I|m = 0] = Pr
[
ŷ < y < RR−1
∣∣∣m = 1] · E [I ∣∣∣m = 1, ŷ < y < RR−1 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
+
{
Pr
[
y ≥ RR−1
∣∣∣m = 1]− Pr [y ≥ RR−1 ∣∣∣m = 0]}︸ ︷︷ ︸,
negative
(26)
where Pr
[
y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1] < Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] follows from the fact that the threshold-
function n˜(y) is monotonically increasing in y.
The first thing that can be observed from (??) is that it is no longer true that families
with migrants tend to invest more than families without migrants; that is, E [I|m = 1]−
E [I|m = 0] ≶ 0. Furthermore, we can also show that OLS effect is always smaller that
the FE effect. We refer to this difference as the OLS bias.
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Proposition 2 The OLS bias is negative, that is:
[E (I|m = 1)− E (I|m = 0)]−[
E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− E (I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
< 0
(27)
Proof. Note: The following proof is conducted for the case in which ŷ ≤ 1. The proof
for the case in which ŷ > 1 is almost identical to this one, and it is available from the
authors upon request.
The expression (??) can be re-ordered as follows:
OLS bias =
[
E
(
I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− E (I|m = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− [E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− E (I|m = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
(28)
Recalling (??), we can observe that the first member of (??) simplifies to:
A = 0− Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] = −Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] .
In the case of the second member of (??), we have:
B = E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− Pr ( ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)E (I ∣∣m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)
− Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)
= E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
) [
1− Pr ( ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr
(
y≥ R
R−1
∣∣∣∣m=1)
− Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)
= −Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) [1− E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
41
Therefore, we can in the end obtain:
A−B = −Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0]+ Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) [1− E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
which is always strictly negative for the combined effect of the following two properties:
1) The monotonicity of n˜(y) implies that: Pr
(
y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0) > Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) .
2) The fact that E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)
< 1. This is because, among the families with
ŷ ≤ y < R/(R− 1) and send migrants, only in those cases in which the migrant manages
to find a good job (which occurs with probability ni) do families invest in the project. 
The OLS bias arises because the OLS regression underestimate the effect of migration
on investment. This occurs because the family-specific level of income (yi) and the mi-
gration decision cannot be separated. In consequence, it is important to control for the
level of income yi or other family-specific characteristics to get an unambiguous effect.
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